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Political Contestation in Global Production Networks 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a critical framework on international management and production 
that draws from the literatures on global commodity chains and global production 
networks (GPNs), from institutional entrepreneurship, as well as from neo-Gramscian 
theory in international political economy. The framework views GPNs as integrated 
economic, political, and discursive systems, in which market and political power are 
intertwined. The framework highlights the contingent stability of GPNs as well as the 
potential for actors to engage politically in contestation and collaboration over system 
governance and the distribution of benefits. The framework offers a multidimensional 
and multi-level approach to understanding power relations, ideology, and value 
appropriation in GPNs. The framework is valuable for examining the intersection of 
GPNs with charged political and social issues such as sweatshops and incomes for coffee 




Political Contestation in Global Production Networks 
When you drink a cup of coffee, you are completing the final link in a global chain of activities 
that made that cup of coffee possible…. That simple act of sipping your coffee connects you to 
peasant farmers in Colombia and Indonesia, to dockworkers in São Paulo and Mombassa, New 
Orleans and San Francisco, and to many others in between (Talbot, 2004: 1). 
 
 
 Multinational corporations (MNCs) face increasing pressure to engage with social issues 
related to their international operations. The pharmaceutical industry, for example, has been 
forced to accept the manufacture of generic drugs for AIDS/HIV in developing countries (Sell & 
Prakash, 2004; Vachani & Smith, 2004). Coffee processors and retailers have been challenged 
over the low prices paid to growers in some Latin American countries (Blowfield, 2004; Kolk, 
2005; Talbot, 2004). Manufacturers of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) face a host of 
activist campaigns and are subject to an international agreement that regulates trade in these 
products (Andrée, 2005). Branded clothing companies have confronted numerous allegations of 
running ‘sweatshops’ in developing countries (Boje, 1998; Tulder & Kolk, 2001). These cases 
exemplify the entanglement of global production networks (GPNs) with charged social and 
political issues. GPNs are thus characterized by contestation as well as collaboration among 
multiple actors, including firms, state and international agencies, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and industry associations, each with their own interests and agendas. 
GPNs are therefore not simply arenas for market competition or chains of value-adding 
activities, but rather comprise complex political-economic systems in which markets, and their 
associated distribution of resources and authority, are constructed within, as well as actively 
shape, their socio-political context. 
A useful starting point for analyzing GPNs can be drawn from Gereffi’s (1994: 2) 
description of ‘Global Commodity Chains’ (GCCs) as “sets of interorganizational networks 
clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one 
another within the world-economy. These networks are situationally specific, socially 
constructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic 
organization.” A number of scholars prefer the phrase ‘Global Production Networks’ (Dicken, 
2003; Ernst & Ravenhill, 1999; Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002) because the 
term ‘network’ implies multiple relational forms and directions and avoids the linear connotation 
of ‘chains’, while ‘production’ is intended to convey not just economic activity but also “the 
social processes involved in producing goods and services and reproducing knowledge, capital 
and labour power” (Henderson et al., 2002: 444). It also avoids potential confusion in the use of 
the term ‘commodity’, which is often used to refer to undifferentiated, low margin products. 
GPNs entail the disaggregation and dispersion of economic activities to multiple 
geographic locations. This dispersion in turn requires a high degree of coordination and 
integration of supply chain activities, which often draws on the organizational capacity and 
geographic reach of MNCs and entails substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
international trade (Caves, 1996; Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995). In many cases, such as 
‘sweatshop’ allegations and high prices for AIDS drugs, it is precisely the linkages created by 
GPNs across disparate regions with vastly different incomes, labor practices, and consumption 
patterns that give rise to contentious social concerns. On account of their economic and political 
character, GPNs are subject to complex forms of governance at multiple levels. Governance is 
defined broadly here to mean the rules, institutions, and norms that channel and constrain 
economic activity and its impacts. It therefore includes not only national level regulation and 
formal international agreements, but also the coordination of supply chains and the promulgation 
of private codes of conduct regarding labor or environmental standards (Cutler, Hauffler, and 
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Porter, 1999; Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005; Levy & Newell, 2005; Prakash & Hart, 
1999).  
This paper develops a critical framework on international management and production 
that analyzes the intersection of geographically dispersed economic networks with controversial 
social issues. Drawing from literatures on institutional theory and entrepreneurship, global 
commodity chains and global production networks, and neo-Gramscian approaches to 
international political economy, the paper proposes that GPNs are simultaneously economic and 
political phenomena. The framework is illustrated using a range of empirical examples, but with 
a focus on the coffee sector. The paper unfolds in the following manner. The remainder of the 
introduction introduces key concepts and outlines the core argument. The paper then presents a 
brief critique of conventional interpretations of international production, followed by an 
elaboration of the three theoretical approaches employed here to develop an understanding of 
GPNs as integrated economic-political systems. The articulation of these three theoretical 
approaches provides a multi-level perspective that yields a number of insights into the 
relationship between material and discursive dimensions of GPNs, the dynamic processes by 
which they are constituted and challenged, and their interaction with wider structures of power. 
A sociological perspective on markets suggests their embeddedness within wider social 
and political institutions (Callon, 1998; Granovetter, 1985; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2002), and 
the construction of managerial roles and consumer identities within this larger system (Olds & 
Thrift, 2005). The economic structures of GPNs, represented, for example, in the lack of market 
power of developing country coffee growers or garment workers, tend to reflect broader 
geopolitical, ethnic, and gender power structures. Yet the GPN framework developed in this 
paper also pays attention to the agency of actors in mobilizing and deploying resources, forging 
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alliances, shaping regulatory structures, and framing issues. From this perspective, GPNs 
resemble contested organizational fields in which actors struggle over the construction of 
economic relationships, governance structures, institutional rules and norms, and discursive 
frames (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Rao, Morrill, Zald, 2000). 
These efforts of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ to change fields are frequently met with resistance 
from “field dominants”, defined by McAdam and Scott (2005: 17) as “those individuals, groups, 
and organizations around whose actions and interests the field tends to revolve.”  
The concept of a field derives from institutional theory’s attention to the behavior of 
organizations within interrelated networks. According to Rao et al. (2000: 251), “Organizational 
fields….consist of regulatory agencies, professional societies, consumers, suppliers, and 
organizations that produce similar goods and services”, and these fields “exhibit distinctive 
‘rules of the game’, relational networks, and resource distributions.” Institutional theory has 
traditionally sought to explain convergence and stability in fields in terms of regulative, 
cognitive, and normative isomorphic forces (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott & Meyer, 1994). 
More recently, institutional theorists have emphasized the conflictual nature of contestation 
among actors over field structures and processes (Fligstein, 1997; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Levy 
& Rothenberg, 2002; Maguire et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2000). Hoffman’s (1999: 352) analysis of 
competing environmental practices and discursive framings in the chemical industry highlights 
how “field constituents are often armed with opposing perspectives rather than with common 
rhetorics. The process may more resemble institutional war than isomorphic dialogue.”  
While GPNs constitute social institutions, they also have an important material 
dimension. Recent theoretical and empirical work on global commodity chains and production 
networks is valuable in illuminating the inequalities that stem from asymmetric power relations 
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across firms and regions, recasting value chains as systems of value appropriation as much as 
creation (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; Henderson et al., 2002). This stream of research is 
valuable in highlighting a political dimension of market power, though it tends to take a rather 
economistic approach to power relations in value chains, focusing on the construction and 
protection of monopolistic advantages that generate high margins, or ‘economic rent’, while 
neglecting wider institutions of power. The present framework addresses these shortcomings by 
drawing from the growing literature that extends Gramscian theory to consider the nature of 
power and ideology in structures of international governance (Cox, 1987; Gill, 1993; van der 
Pijl, 1998). The neo-Gramscian approach is particularly useful for understanding the dialectical 
manner in which GPNs are shaped by, yet constitutive of, the broader context of neoliberal 
ideologies and institutions, geopolitical inter-state structures, and patriarchal gender relations. 
The Gramscian concept of hegemony offers a rich theoretical perspective on the configuration of 
economic, organizational, and discursive forces that stabilize and structure GPNs, and the nature 
of consent within these systems. Moreover, a Gramscian understanding suggests the potential 
and limitations of strategies for challenging and changing GPNs, and the intertwined political 
and economic character of these challenges.  
It is hardly novel, of course, to observe that the globalization of production entails an 
international division of labor that reflects and reproduces class, gender, and ethnic inequalities 
(Fernandez-Kelly, 1994; Frobel, Heinrichs, & Kreye, 1977). In developing countries in 
particular, the repression of unions (Boje, 1998) intersects with patriarchy (Calás & Smircich, 
1993) and geopolitical relations in the constitution of conducive nodes within GPNs (Enloe, 
1989). Fuentes and Ehrenreich (1983) used the term ‘global factory’ to suggest the mobilization 
and integration of these power asymmetries into capitalist production. The conceptual framework 
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developed here is innovative in the way it synthesizes and extends concepts from the three 
theoretical streams to understand the integrated economic, political, and discursive dimensions of 
GPNs. The international dispersion of GPNs masks asymmetries of power and income to some 
extent, but also creates opportunities for strategic agents to reveal these asymmetries, find points 
of tension and leverage, and challenge their structures and processes. McAdam and Scott (2005: 
17) describe challengers as “those individuals, groups and organizations seeking to challenge the 
advantaged position of dominants or fundamental structural-procedural features of the field.” 
These challenges generally entail economic, political, and discursive strategies, mirroring the 
elements of structural stability. However, even when challenger groups achieve some significant 
impact, such as the development of industry codes of conduct, the process of corporate 
accommodation frequently reinforces the legitimacy, and hence the political and market 
positioning of dominant firms. This dynamic process of contestation and accommodation casts 
new light on corporate social responsibility debates. 
 
Conventional Perspectives on International Production and Management  
The political understanding of GPNs proposed in this paper contrasts with conventional 
approaches to international production, which revolve around economistic considerations of 
location-specific advantages, such as factor costs and market access, and firm-specific 
advantages, such as technological or marketing expertise. These advantages are not static 
endowments, but rather dynamic capacities that accumulate at the firm and regional cluster level 
(Doeringer & Terkla, 1995; Porter, 1990; Shaver & Flyer, 2000). Within this framework, high 
transaction costs for intangible and transaction-specific assets would lead multinational 
corporations to internalize markets for them and directly control overseas operations (Buckley & 
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Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988; Teece, 1986). MNCs are frequently conceived as overcoming 
barriers to trade through their ability to coordinate flows of goods, money, information, and 
people around the globe (Caves, 1996; Eden, 1991). MNCs can employ FDI as a substitute or as 
a complement for domestic production and exports (Kotabe, 1992; Salomon & Shaver, 2005). 
By the mid-1980s, production processes were increasingly being decomposed into 
constituent activities and dispersed to disparate geographic locations. Porter’s (1985) conception 
of the ‘value chain’ became widely adopted as a conceptual framework for considering the 
linked set of economic activities that ‘add value’ at every stage, from research and development 
to final assembly and marketing. The task for managers in this framework is to construct the 
value chain so that activities are dispersed to appropriate locations in terms of proximity to 
markets, production costs, and resource availability (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Kotabe & Swan, 
1994; Swamidass & Kotabe, 1993). At the same time, value chains require coordination and 
integration in order to take advantage of scale economies, learning opportunities, and the benefits 
of integrated logistics and lean production (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Levy, 1997). The central 
challenge of international business is seen as balancing the sometimes conflicting pressures for 
local responsiveness and for global integration (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 
1987). 
The increasing fragmentation of international production is driven by a series of 
economic, technological, organizational, and political factors. The emerging digital 
telecommunications infrastructure affords a dramatic increase in capacity and function at sharply 
lower costs, reducing the transaction costs of coordinating dispersed operations and facilitating 
trade in engineering, medical, legal, and other services. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, a broad liberalization trend has brought policies that favor foreign investment, exports, and 
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unrestricted capital flows (Dunning, 1993; Henderson et al., 2002). Developing countries, 
especially China and India, have created significant regional advantages based not just on low-
costs but also on technical expertise and growing firm-level capabilities (Friedman, 2005). Large 
firms have also augmented their capacity for coordinating dispersed networks by developing new 
organizational practices and more modular production processes that rely on standards and 
routinized interfaces with suppliers and customers (Ernst, 2000; Ernst & Ravenhill, 1999). As 
Buckley and Ghauri (2004: 83) put it:  
The managers of MNEs are increasingly able to segment their activities and to seek the 
optimal location for increasingly specialised slivers of activity. This ability to separate 
and relocate stages of production has led to a boom in manufacturing in China and 
service activities (e.g. call centres) in India. MNEs are also increasingly able to 
coordinate these activities by means of a wide variety of mechanisms from wholly owned 
FDI through licensing and subcontracting to market relationships. The more precise use 
of location and ownership strategies by MNEs is the very essence of increasing 
globalisation. 
 
 Conventional theories thus view the growth of international production and its specific 
configuration to be a result of economic forces that promote efficiency and value creation. Firms 
are viewed as efficiency-seeking agents, the organizational incarnations of more abstract 
phenomena such as comparative advantage. If international production is increasingly taking 
place within networks of subcontractors that are coordinated by dominant firms without direct 
ownership ties, then this is viewed as a market response to the lower costs of inter-firm relative 
to intra-firm coordination (Ernst, 2000). According to Henderson (2002: 444), “the GPN is seen 
to supersede the transnational corporation as the most effective form of industrial organization.” 
There is little doubt that economic forces play a central role in structuring GPNs, or that 
the growth in various forms of international production has contributed to rising output and 
incomes, at least in certain regions and particular sectors of the population. The problem is that 
purely economic accounts offer an inadequate portrayal of the complex ways in which market 
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forces themselves operate within social and political contexts, as well as shape those contexts. 
An undue emphasis on efficiency, at the expense of concerns with equity or power, is closely 
tied to the broader ideology of free trade and a neoliberal discourse promoting the benefits of 
privatization and globalization (Gill & Law, 1993).  
Emblematic of this approach is a recent series of articles on offshore sourcing published 
in the influential journal of McKinsey, the management consulting firm. Agrawal and Farrell 
(2003: 37) argue in The McKinsey Quarterly that “companies move their business services 
offshore because they can make more money—which means that wealth is created for the United 
States as well as for the country receiving the jobs.” According to Agrawal and Farrell’s analysis 
(2003: 41), “For every dollar of spending on business services that moves offshore, US 
companies save 58 cents, mainly in wages” and these lower costs constitute “by far the greatest 
source of value creation for the US economy.” In a critique of the McKinsey article, Levy (2005: 
689) draws attention to the ideological assumptions embedded in the argument: “Wealth transfer 
is equated with wealth creation, corporate interests are conflated with those of society as a 
whole, and the process is portrayed as natural and inevitable, leading to prosperity for 
industrialized and developing countries alike.” Reducing wages does not ‘create value’, even in 
narrow economistic terms, though it certainly does transfer wealth from workers to shareholders.  
This optimistic rendition of international production is far from uncontested. Indeed, 
there has been a resurgence of popular discontent and academic debate concerning every facet of 
globalization, from its impact on employment, inequality, and development (Korten, 1995; 
Narula & Dunning, 2000) to its social and cultural significance (Bauman, 1998; Castells, 1997; 
Lash & Urry, 1994). While some have argued that globalization increases the power of MNCs 
and renders states increasingly powerless and irrelevant (Griffen, 2003; Ohmae, 1991; Strange, 
 9
1996), others assert that while economic integration might undermine traditional notions of 
sovereignty, it transforms the role of states and the nature and locus of governance (Braithwaite 
& Drahos, 2000; Carnoy & Castells, 2001; Held & McGrew, 1993; Sassen, 1996). There have 
been significant challenges to the very idea of globalization, with some claiming that MNCs still 
retain a strongly national character and that the extent of global integration is neither 
unprecedented nor irreversible (Berger & Dore, 1996; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Pauly & Reich, 
1997). This perspective has led some to interpret globalization as a discursive construction that 
promotes the importance of pursuing ‘competitiveness’ and serves to discipline firms, labor, and 
governments (Cerny, 1997; Piven & Cloward, 1997; Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995: 169).   
These debates, for the most part, have occurred amongst scholars of sociology, economic 
geography, and international political economy. Within international business, the bargaining 
theory of foreign direct investment proposes that the distribution of benefits between MNCs and 
host countries is a function of the bargaining power of the parties (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Vernon, 
1977). While this opens the door to a consideration of distributional impacts, the dominant view 
is that power shifts in favor of host countries over time. Moreover, bargaining theory does not 
address the presence of multiple actors in contested issue arenas. It has a narrow focus on 
economic sources of power, and it assumes that states act in the general interest, neglecting class, 
ethnic, and gender divisions, or potential alliances between the state and foreign capital (Evans, 
1979; Gereffi, 1985; Levy & Prakesh, 2003; Ramamurti, 2001). 
Controversial issues in international business have received considerable scrutiny from 
the perspective of business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Working conditions 
in subcontractors of famous brand-name shoe and apparel firms such as Nike or The Gap, many 
of which are based in developing countries, provide one prominent example (Boje, 1998; Radin, 
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2004; Tulder & Kolk, 2001). More recently, a growing literature on ‘ethical sourcing’ has drawn 
attention to the low prices paid to coffee growers in relation to the premium prices charged by 
stores such as Starbucks (Blowfield, 2004; Kolk, 2005). Ethics and CSR perspectives have 
tended to view corporate practices, prices, and working conditions as matters of managerial 
discretion rather than an outcome of production networks as economic, political, and ideological 
systems.  
The coffee case illustrates the economic, political, and ideological context in which GPNs 
are embedded. Coffee growers in developing countries are paid an average of about 50 cents per 
pound of coffee exported, though many growers only receive 20-30 cents (Kolk, 2005; Talbot, 
2004). While a substantial amount of coffee is grown by smallholders or co-ops, large 
plantations predominate in some regions with workers receiving a very small proportion of the 
coffee price. Various intermediaries in coffee growing countries, including buyers, exporters, 
and credit providers, take a significant slice of the value chain. By far the largest amount of 
‘value added’ is realized in the major Western consumer markets, where coffee wholesales for 
around $4 per pound and retailers such as Starbucks sell for about $10, with specialty and 
organic coffees reaching $14 a pound. Brewed liquid coffee sells for the equivalent of $60-100 
per pound. As Talbot (2004: 163) makes clear in his extensive study, the distribution of income 
along the chain is a function of “struggles over the structure of the commodity chain and the 
politics of its governance.” To understand the working conditions facing workers and 
smallholders, we need to examine the market power of branded multinational coffee roasters and 
retailers, the consumer culture that grants status to these brands, geopolitical relations between 
the United States, Latin America, and other regions, the system of ethnic, class, and gender 
relations in growing regions, the ideology of neoliberalism that underpins a faith in ‘free 
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markets’, and the role of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank in promoting cash crop 
coffee exports from heavily indebted developing countries. Markets are clearly highly political 
constructs.1  
 
Global Production Networks as Contested Fields  
The political character of markets is the common denominator of the three theoretical lenses 
brought to bear in this paper. First, I draw from institutional theory to posit that global 
production networks, as a set of structured yet contested relations, resemble institutional fields. 
This perspective offers a number of theoretical insights into their constitution and possibilities 
for change. Fields are frequently conceived at the national level, though Scott (1994: 206) has 
argued that: “Organizations are in the same field if they take one another into account, regardless 
of the geographic propinquity. In this way, the field conception emphasizes the possible 
importance of distant, non-local connections among organizations.” Nevertheless, national 
institutional environments are quite distinct in their regulatory, cultural and normative aspects. 
As a result, organizations that span national borders, such as MNCs and some NGOs, are subject 
to divergent pressures at the level of national sub-units (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Westney, 1993). 
Simultaneously, these organizations can be members of a common industry, creating convergent 
pressures. Indeed, ‘issue arenas’ such as biotechnology and sweatshops can be considered as 
fields with their own institutional infrastructure and norms at the international level (Levy & 
Kolk, 2002).  
 GPNs comprise diverse types of organizations, often in quite different industries. For 
example, a coffee production network encompasses coffee growers in developing countries, 
multinational food processors, traders active in futures and options markets, and large-scale 
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retailers. These corporate forms interact with other actors who are not directly part of the 
production chain, such as NGOs, government agencies, and international organizations. Indeed, 
actors might barely recognize their membership in a common network. Awareness of their 
identity within a common system grows as actors collaborate and compete over economic, 
regulatory, and ideological dimensions of the network. Hardy and Phillips (1998: 218) contend 
that fields “emerge as different organizations perceive themselves to be connected to common 
issues. They are not objective, predetermined structures, but processes of social construction and 
meaning creation, wherein social order is negotiated.” For example, NGOs have collaborated 
with coffee growers, processors, and retailers in establishing Fair Trade programs in which 
growers are paid higher rates for certified coffee that is marketed under the Fair Trade label to 
Western consumers for premium prices (Kolk, 2005). The Fair Trade campaign by NGOs such 
as Global Exchange and the Rainforest Alliance has stimulated awareness that coffee farmers 
and retailers are members of a system possessing important social and political dimensions. The 
campaign thus played a role in constructing and politicizing the GPN as a field in which 
corporate practices are linked economically and discursively to poor working conditions for 
growers in developing countries. This challenge to existing market relations has been countered 
by the coffee industry, which argues that the problem is oversupply on world markets rather than 
income distribution within the chain. This claim is framed within the broader ideology of free 
trade to suggest that any interference in the market will only exacerbate matters (Blowfield, 
2004; Talbot, 2004).  
Challenging existing field structures and practices, and attempting to construct new 
institutional forms is a political project led by institutional entrepreneurs (Fligstein, 1997; Hardy, 
Phillips, and Lawrence, 2003; Maguire et al., 2004). Social movement theory has been influential 
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in suggesting the forms of agency, sources of power, and strategic repertoire available to them 
(Fligstein, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). As Rao et al. (2000: 240) put it:   
We conceptualize the construction of new organizational forms as a political process in 
which social movements play a double-edged role: They de-institutionalize existing 
beliefs, norms, and values embodied in extant forms, and establish new forms that 
instantiate new beliefs, norms and values. Crucial in these processes are institutional 
entrepreneurs who lead efforts to identify political opportunities, frame issues and 
problems, and mobilize constituencies. 
  
Hardy and Philips (1998: 219) point to three aspects of power that are important in these 
processes: formal authority, the control of critical resources, and discursive legitimacy. 
Organization theorists, however, have tended to emphasize the social construction of fields and 
hence the importance of political contestation in the cognitive and normative realms (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2006; Selsky, Spicer, Teicher, 2003). Research has therefore tended to focus on the 
efforts to advance competing frames in efforts to secure legitimacy and build coalitions 
(Hensmans, 2003; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003). The emphasis on discourse and 
framing strategies has tended to obscure other dimensions in which fields are ordered. In 
particular, GPNs are structured in the economic and technological realms, and are subject to 
governance structures capable of exerting regulatory and coercive authority. In the following 
section, the evolution of the concept of global production networks is elaborated, in order to 
examine more closely the nature of order and power within these specific types of fields.  
 
From Value Chains to Global Production Networks 
 
Stephen Hymer’s groundbreaking theoretical work on foreign investment and MNCs is now 
recognized by international business scholars as an essential starting point for investigating the 
relationship between market and political power (Buckley, 2006; Pitelis, 2006). Hymer (1972, 
1976) posited that MNCs possess unique firm-specific advantages that afford significant market 
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power in oligopolistic industries through control of key technologies, brands, and distribution 
networks. Hymer was the first to recognize that MNCs are created when firms internalize 
markets for these advantages across national borders (Pitelis, 2006), and he shifted the frame of 
analysis for international production from finance to questions of control (Strange & Newton, 
2006). 
Hymer (1979) later developed these insights into a radical political-economic perspective 
in which MNCs “would transplant their vertical power structures to the globe, creating a vertical 
division of power between ‘superior and inferior’ states, cities and indeed peoples” (Pitelis, 
2006: 104). Hymer’s analysis of MNCs within oligopolistic markets paralleled the development 
of critical macro-perspectives on trade and investment, particularly the dependency school 
(Amin, 1976; Evans, 1979) and world systems theory (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995; 
Wallerstein, 2004), which viewed relations between industrial and developing countries as 
fundamentally exploitative and conditioned on unequal terms of trade. Indeed, Hymer’s work 
constitutes the micro-foundations of these unequal relations. Frobel et al. (1977) described the 
ensuing international inequalities in power and income as ‘The New International Division of 
Labor’. Feminist scholars drew attention to the way in which international capital was 
reorganizing along gendered as well as ethnic lines (Calás & Smircich, 1993; Chang, 2000; 
Fuentes & Ehrenreich, 1983), while more recent neo-colonialist analyses (Banerjee & Linstead, 
2001) argue that these asymmetric relationships are embedded in ideological systems that 
devalue non-western norms and knowledge. 
Hymer’s key insight was that market power is thoroughly imbricated with political 
power, at the sectoral and even firm level. The market power associated with firm-specific assets 
such as technology or market access bears some affinity to the concept of resource dependency 
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as a source of power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Hymer’s treatment, however, relates the market 
power of particular firms to more structural features of a stratified global political economy in 
which Western states and firms occupy a privileged position. In this vein, Gereffi (1985) and 
Evans (1979) described how MNCs enhance their power through their market and technology 
strategies and their alliances with local political elites. Gereffi’s contribution, which was framed 
as a rejoinder to the ‘obsolescing bargain’ approach to MNC–host country relations (Kobrin, 
1987; Vernon, 1971), served as a critical bridge to the development of Gereffi’s more recent 
work on Global Commodity Chains. 
 Hymer has been widely criticized for emphasizing power over efficiency-based 
explanations of MNCs (Teece, 2006). These critiques, however, elide the extent to which market 
power is intertwined with efficiency, so that value creation is inextricably entangled with value 
capture. Pitelis (2006: 107) points out that Penrose (1959) had earlier observed that firm-specific 
‘efficiency’ advantages derived from innovation can constitute the basis for monopolistic power. 
A common denominator of contemporary strategy theory, from Porter’s (1985) ‘5-forces’ 
analysis of market structures to the resource based view (Barney, 1991) and recent writing on 
dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), is that firms only derive above-normal 
profits from advantages that are sheltered from imitation. Walmart, for example, has firm-
specific efficiency advantages that it has leveraged into substantial market power over 
competitors and suppliers, but this power takes on more explicitly political dimensions when 
wielded over labor and government agencies (Lichtenstein, 2006).  
 Conventional analyses of market power do not treat the topic as inherently political. 
States do, of course, provide legal sanction for the protection of patents, copyrights, and other 
forms of intellectual property rights (IPRs), and MNCs have increasingly sought to extend and 
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protect these IPRs through multilateral organizations such as the WTO (Sell & Prakash, 2004).  
Mintzberg builds on the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) to argue that firms are deeply 
involved in negotiating their external environments in order to build and protect market position, 
such that any distinction between the economic and the political “must be considered artificial” 
(Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998: 235). This confluence of economic and political power 
is illustrated in Hirsch’s (1975) classic study of the pharmaceutical industry, in which he argued 
that its superior profitability derived from effective management of the institutional environment, 
particularly product entry, pricing, patent protection, and media coverage. The development of 
instant coffee illuminates the political nature of market positioning and the difficulty in 
demarcating value creation from value capture. Instant coffee, initially developed by Swiss MNC 
Nestlé, is much more capital and technology intensive than regular coffee, creating barriers to 
entry for smaller companies from developing countries (Talbot, 2004: 35). When Brazilian 
companies attempted to enter the instant coffee market to increase their own ‘value added’ and 
export it in bulk to western coffee MNCs, the latter objected, despite attractive prices. The coffee 
majors understood that this was a struggle for power and control over the industry (2004: 140). 
 Global Commodity Chain analysis develops Hymer’s earlier insights to examine the 
distribution of ‘value added’ and rent in a chain by analyzing the interaction of geographic and 
firm-specific advantages, the locational configuration of activities, the institutional context, and 
the governance structures that regulate and integrate dispersed operations (Bair, 2005; Gereffi & 
Korzeniewicz, 1994; Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1977). GCC analysis has provided a series of rich 
case studies of the dynamics by which firms build positions of market power and defend them in 
the face of relentless competitive pressures to commoditize products and services (Bair & 
Gereffi, 2003). These studies, located in the context of the spatial and political structure of 
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production activities, often highlight the constraints as well as opportunities facing developing 
countries as they engage with globalization processes (Kaplinsky, 2000). 
GCC analysis has brought attention to the relationship between market power and 
network-level governance. Gereffi (1994) distinguishes between producer-driven chains, such as 
the automobile industry, in which manufacturers dominate network coordination and capture the 
lion’s share of value, and buyer-driven chains, such as the clothing sector, in which companies 
derive substantial profits from strong brand names and distribution while orchestrating networks 
of low-margin subcontractors. Kaplinsky (2000) discusses three forms of chain governance, 
legislative (rule setting), judicial (rule enforcement) and executive (corporate management). 
These governance functions relate to logistics, technical standards, quality, and design. 
The emphasis on networks rather than chains among those who prefer GPN terminology 
highlights the “intricate links – horizontal, diagonal, as well as vertical – forming multi-
dimensional, multi-layered lattices of economic activity” (Henderson et al., 2002: 442). Ernst’s 
rendition of GPNs emphasizes modes of governance that facilitate technical coordination of 
spatially dispersed activity and facilitate the flow of tacit knowledge (Ernst, 2000; Ernst & 
Ravenhill, 1999). For economic geographers, the GPN framework examines the dynamic 
linkages and institutionalized power relations that these networks create not just across economic 
space, but also across social and institutional contexts, at national, regional, and sub-national 
levels (Dicken, Kelly, Olds, & Yeung, 2001). Overall, GPN methodology attempts to 
characterize: 
the networks of firms involved in R&D, design, production and marketing of a given 
product, and how these are organized globally and regionally; the distribution of 
corporate power within those networks, and changes therein; the significance of labour 
and the processes of value creation and transfer; the institutions – particularly 
government agencies, but also in some cases trade unions, employer associations and 
NGOs – that influence firm strategy in the particular locations absorbed into the 
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production chain; and the implications of all of these for technological upgrading, value-
adding and capturing, economic prosperity etc. (Henderson et al., 2002: 447). 
 
Despite these lofty ambitions, most of the studies spawned by the GPN framework to 
date are, in practice, very similar to those generated using GCC analysis. Much of the discussion 
concerns market power and consequent rents due to firm-level expertise and skills in 
coordinating complex networks. Indeed, the GCC and GPN literatures display an increasingly 
developmental tone, discussing how firms in developing countries might ‘upgrade’ their 
capabilities and thus create and capture more ‘value’ locally (Kaplinsky, 2005). The GCC/GPN 
framework appears to be converging with more conventional approaches to competitiveness and 
losing touch with its more critical origins (Bair, 2005). The discussion of governance emphasizes 
economic coordination rather than political contestation or the broader institutions and discursive 
structures in which markets are embedded. Moreover, the ideologies that constitute and 
legitimate particular forms of governance, production and income distribution receive little 
attention. The neo-Gramscian approach to international relations provides a valuable theoretical 
framework for locating GPNs in this wider context, as well as for understanding the relationship 
between material and discursive dimensions of order and power within these fields. 
 
A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Global Production Networks 
Interest in Gramsci’s writing2 has enjoyed a modest revival in recent years in the field of 
international political economy (Gill, 1993; Jessop, 2005; Murphy, 1998; van der Pijl, 1998) and, 
to a lesser degree, in the literature on social movements, organizational resistance, and global 
managerial networks (Barker, Johnson, & Lavalette, 2001; Carroll & Carson, 2003; Mumby, 
1997; Sanbonmatsu, 2004). Here the term ‘neo-Gramscian’ is used to acknowledge that the 
conceptual framework presented here extends Gramsci’s ideas beyond national class conflict to 
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examine conflictual social issues in international arenas engaging business and other societal 
actors. A neo-Gramscian approach offers an integrative perspective on GPNs that takes account 
of both their economic structure and their institutional character as an amalgam of rules, norms, 
and taken-for-granted ideas and practices. The notion of hegemonic stability in GPNs illuminates 
the process by which actors grant consent, at least contingently, to a set of arrangements in which 
authority and rewards are distributed asymmetrically; the contingency of hegemony points to the 
potential for strategic agents to challenge GPNs and highlights the political character of ensuing 
contestation. 
Gramsci conceived of society as a complex dynamic system of structures and forces 
operating at multiple levels. He used the term hegemony to refer to a condition of relative 
stability in this system, in which a dominant alliance, or ‘historical bloc’, would emerge. This 
historical bloc sustains its position through the coercive authority of the state, dominance in the 
economic realm, and the consensual legitimacy of civil society. A key Gramscian insight is that 
hegemony in capitalist democracies relies primarily on consensual processes that accommodate 
subordinate groups to some degree, through a measure of political and material compromise and 
by the dissemination of ideologies that convey a mutuality of interests. Hegemony thus entails: 
not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral 
unity…the development and expansion of the [dominant] group are conceived of, and 
presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion…In other words, the 
dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate 
groups (Gramsci, 1971: 181). 
 
The globalization of economic and political processes in recent decades has led a number 
of observers to posit the emergence of a “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair, 1998), composed 
of senior managers, professionals, academics, and state officials linked in a loose alliance and 
sharing a common ideology. Gill (1995: 400) uses the Gramscian term “transnational historical 
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bloc” to describe this formation “with its nucleus largely comprising elements of the G-7 state 
apparatuses and transnational capital…and associated privileged workers and smaller firms.” An 
historical bloc possesses two closely related dimensions; first, it refers to the organizational 
structure of the system, comprising alliances and hierarchical relations among various actors; 
second, it relates to the specific alignment of material, organizational, and discursive formations 
that stabilize and reproduce relations of production, meaning, and power. An historical bloc is 
‘hegemonic’ when the synchronization of its various elements achieves a degree of stability and 
consent grounded in the construction of common interests. It should be emphasized that this 
multilayered concept of hegemony is quite different from the traditional use of the term in 
international relations to refer to the power of dominant states (Keohane, 1984). 
Some striking parallels are evident between the concept of hegemony and the isomorphic 
stability of institutional theory (Scott & Meyer, 1994). Both view social order as contingent on a 
balance of the coercive pressure of rules and more consensual forces of norms, cognitive frames, 
and taken-for-granted ideas. Moreover, the process of constructing (or challenging) hegemony 
corresponds closely to the “political model of action in the organizational field” (Fligstein, 1997: 
398) in organizational theory (see also Rao et al., 2000; Seo & Creed, 2002). Fligstein points to 
the importance of actors maintaining an image of selflessness as they frame issues in ways that 
resonate with existing conceptions of interest in order to build wider coalitions. Similarly, 
Maguire et al. (2004: 658) argue that the key to success in constructing and changing fields “is 
the way in which institutional entrepreneurs connect their change projects to the activities and 
interests of other actors in a field, crafting their project to fit the conditions of the field itself.” 
The concept of hegemony enriches our understanding of institutional fields in several ways, 
however. First, the notion of hegemony as an interwoven material and discursive formation 
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provides a healthy antidote to the tendency in institutional theory to neglect the role of the 
economic and technological realm. Second, it provides a more dynamic view of social reality as 
“a relation of forces in continuous motion and shift of equilibrium” (Gramsci, 1971: 172). Third, 
it emphasizes the political nature of the struggles to shape the economic, discursive, and 
organizational dimensions of a field.  
Importantly, Gramsci's concept of hegemony illuminates why weaker groups might 
consent to participate in a GPN in which they have little influence over the ‘rules of the game’ 
and do not enjoy a ‘fair share’ of the benefits. Hegemony conveys a subtle balance of ideology 
that legitimates the outcomes of a system, substantive concessions to weaker groups, and a 
degree of economic and political coercion. Consent, then, does not mean that weaker groups are 
dupes suffering from a form of ‘false consciousness’, as has been alleged by some critics of the 
dominant ideology thesis (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1980). Gramsci’s concept of ideology is 
not a rigid system of ideas imposed on people in conflict with a set of pre-constituted, objective 
interests; rather, ideology is a relatively coherent articulation of meaning, embodied in 
institutions, language, and practices, that constructs people’s identities and interests, aligning 
them to some degree with the broader polity (Hall, 1986: 20; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 67). Yet 
ideology is also partial and fragmented (Gramsci, 1971: 327; Mumby, 1997: 344), creating space 
for resistance. Consent thus rests on strategic acquiescence as much as ideological domination 
(Levy & Egan, 2003; Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1982). 
 Though much of Gramsci’s analysis was situated at the national level (Germain & 
Kenny, 1998), his writing indicates an appreciation that regional and national fields comprise 
subsystems within broader international governance structures with economic and ideological 
elements: “international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, 
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creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, 
born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on 
the local interplay of combinations” (Gramsci 1971: 182). He also noted the emergence of 
“international public and private organizations that might be the shapeless and chaotic civil 
society of a larger, economically concrete social order, and that certainly promoted such an order 
— the League of Nation’s economic agencies, the International Chamber of Commerce, the 
World Council of Churches, the ILO, and various international fraternal orders ” (Murphy, 1998: 
423). 
 Locating GPNs in the context of transnational hegemonic structures provides more 
insight into their constitution and struggles over their operation. Sklair (1997) argues that 
transnational industry groupings such as the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue play a strategic 
role in forging the infrastructure of an emerging transnational bloc.3 Cox (1987) describes the 
growth and coordination at a global level of economic structures, neoliberal and consumerist 
ideologies, and political institutions such as the World Trade Organization, which promulgate 
rules and align interests. At the center of this bloc, Cox argues, is a transnational managerial 
class, which, despite internal rivalries, displays an ‘awareness of a common concern to maintain 
the system’ (1987: 359): 
Various institutions have performed the function of articulating strategies in this common 
concern: the Trilateral Commission, the OECD, the IMF, and the World Bank all serve as 
foci for generating the policy consensus for the maintenance and defense of the 
system…Prestigious business schools and international management training programs 
socialize new entrants to the values, lifestyles, language (in the sense of shared concepts, 
usages, and symbols), and business practices of the class. 
 
Recent empirical work using network analysis (Carroll & Carson, 2003: 47) found that 
“amid the persistence of national corporate power structures, the global policy groups fulfill an 
integrative function, bringing together corporate directors and capitalist interests from various 
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quarters of the world-system’s centre.” The dominant ideology of this transnational elite 
embodies a “neoliberal discourse of governance that stresses the efficiency, welfare, and freedom 
of the market, and self-actualisation through the process of consumption” (Gill, 1995: 401). This 
ideology is buttressed by panoptic surveillance mechanisms that impose financial discipline on 
states, companies, and individuals, from the monitoring of inflation rates and budget deficits to 
corporate and personal credit ratings (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000). Gill terms the integration of 
the structural power of capital with market and consumerist ideology “disciplinary neo-
liberalism”, which generates powerful pressures to intensify the commodification of labor, 
nature, and other aspects of life:  “A remarkable feature of contemporary world society is how 
more and more aspects of everyday life in OECD nations have come to be premised upon or 
pervaded by market values, representations, technological innovation, the hyper-mobility of 
financial capital, and some types of information flows” (Gill, 1995: 409). 
 GPNs thus exist within the ‘transnational space’ that is constituted and structured by 
transnational elites, institutions, and ideologies (Faist, 2000; Morgan, 2001). Within this space, 
transnational communities emerge with economic systems, relations of power and institutional 
forms that are distinct from, though interact with, national or region-bound forms (Urry, 2000). 
For Morgan (2001: 118) these communities comprise transnational corporations, regulatory 
agencies, and cognitive and normative frameworks which “have to be conceptualized in terms of 
the interplay between top-down projects of transnationalism, pursued by powerful actors, and 
bottom-up processes of mutual identification and collective awareness.” Morgan (2001: 125) 
points to the crucial role of the business press and business schools in creating a sense of 
common identity and interests, a shared understanding of business practices, and providing 
points of access to transnational networks. Olds and Thrift (2005) use the term “cultural circuit 
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of capital” to refer to the flows of knowledge, ideas, and values that bind together “global 
assemblages” of actors and economic practices. They note the “the role of business schools as 
the key nodes in this circuit” (2005: 272), alongside management consultancies and gurus, and 
they also point to the role of the media as “key means of transport, amplifiers, and generators of 
business knowledge” (2005: 274). Olds and Thrift argue that states are also mobilized within this 
cultural circuit of capital to assume the mantle of securing economic growth and national 
competitiveness, to which end they endeavor to produce “pliant but enterprising subjects” (2005: 
275) with appropriate sets of skills and attitudes to succeed in highly competitive global labor 
markets. Policymakers and professionals at the state and regional level are thus accomplices in 
the rise of the ‘competition state’ (Cerny, 1997; Palan & Abbott, 1996), whose primary goal is to 
improve ‘competitiveness’ and attract mobile investment (Stopford & Strange, 1991).  
 The neo-Gramscian perspective on GPNs highlights dynamic struggles over governance 
and the relationship between technical features of the market with the wider political 
environment. Shifting regimes of GPN governance in the coffee case illustrate these processes. 
The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in force from 1962 till 1972 established a regulated 
quota system in which growers received modestly higher, if more stable, prices. U.S. support for 
the agreement during these Cold War years has generally been attributed to the desire to create 
sufficient economic stability in Latin America to prevent the spread of Communism; indeed, the 
ICA was viewed as a disguised form of international aid. The American National Coffee 
Association, representing the large national coffee companies, shared these concerns and was 
willing to pay modestly higher prices for more secure and stable supply (Talbot, 2004: 58-60). 
The ICA lapsed in 1972, was renegotiated for a period, but finally collapsed in 1989, leading to a 
dramatic fall in coffee prices. One reason for this shift in governance structure was the growing 
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market power of Western multinational coffee producers and retailers, due to consolidation and 
the growing importance of branded quality coffee. The position of growers was further weakened 
by significant additions to global supply, as a number of developing countries attempted to 
increase their cash crop exports, sometimes under the discipline of World Bank Structural 
Adjustment Programs. By the late 1990s, Vietnam had become the world's second largest coffee 
producer, surpassing Colombia. Under the these conditions, Western coffee MNCs could extend 
their control over the supply chain and gain access to plentiful supplies of cheap coffee without a 
restrictive international agreement.  
 Though the market-based coffee GPN of the 1990s conformed to the dominant neoliberal 
ideology, low prices and the dire poverty of growers created new tensions that NGOs were able 
to exploit, taking advantage of renewed popular concern with aspects of globalization. The 
development of Fair Trade practices and industry codes of conduct, such as the Common Code 
for the Coffee Community (4C), can be interpreted as a political effort to protect the hegemonic 
stability of the GPN from threats to its legitimacy. Industry development and implementation of 
these practices has transformed some NGOs from challengers to partners, widening the 
hegemonic coalition. Couched within the discourse of corporate social responsibility, which 
gained considerable discursive currency in the 1990s, the coffee industry’s accommodation to 
pressure enables it to project moral and intellectual leadership and a sense of congruence 
between corporate goals and the general interest. This is, of course, the essence of hegemony.  
 
An Integrated Analytical Framework on Global Production Networks 
A synthesis of the three theoretical perspectives discussed above yields a framework that views 
GPNs as integrated economic, political, and discursive structures with a degree of structural 
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stability, but subject to challenge by strategic actors. The following section draws out two 
significant implications, first, for the role of economic structures and processes in stabilizing 
fields and reproducing particular discursive forms, and second, for the potential for challengers 
to develop strategies to contest GPNs. 
While scholarship on institutional theory and politically contested fields has paid 
considerable attention to the embeddedness of markets and technologies in social and discursive 
structures, it has neglected the role of the material realm in structuring the social. GCC/GPN 
analysis has brought attention to the importance of market power in the distribution of rent and 
governance, but has neglected discursive dimensions and wider structures of power. For Gramsci 
(1971: 161), “though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily 
be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the nucleus of economic 
activity.” Neo-Gramscian writers in international political economy have described how a 
globalizing economic system is accompanied by a legitimating set of neoliberal ideologies. 
These ideas and norms concerning the benefits of free trade, ‘flexible’ labor, and a fiscally 
restrained state, do not arise spontaneously in a deterministic relation to society’s material ‘base’, 
but rather are developed and disseminated by dominant groups through policy, media, and 
educational channels, sometimes against considerable opposition (McChesney, 2000). 
 Most telling, perhaps, is when a change in material conditions triggers a shift in 
ideology. By the latter 1990s, there was increasing media concern about the economic impact of 
offshore sourcing of high ‘value added’ products and services and associated skilled employment 
(Kletzer, 2001; Levy, 2005). Free trade ideology had been firmly entrenched among policy and 
professional elites since the rise of the United Kingdom as a global economic power in the mid 
19th century, leading most economists and the financial press to respond with assurances that 
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comparative advantage theory still applied, so that offshoring presents another opportunity for 
Americans to upgrade their skills even further (Swann, 2004). In 2004, however, the economist 
and Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson (2004) published a paper demonstrating that the United 
States would be hurt by trade with India and China if those countries improved their export 
performance in sectors traditionally dominated by the United States, such as software and aircraft 
manufacturing. The paper does not rely on any sophisticated new analysis and revisits ideas 
originally proposed in the 1970s; its appearance perhaps signals the opening of a fissure in the 
hegemonic free trade system. 
  Here we posit that material structures play an important role in stabilizing fields at the 
level of GPNs, by reproducing particular ideologies and by generating the economic incentives 
required to induce cooperation from a diverse set of actors. ‘Business models’ need to generate 
profits for firms, wages for labor, and result in sufficient demand from consumers. Of course, 
these business models are also shaped by the political economy of the network, through property 
rights and labor law, trade and tax policy, and subsidies, and companies frequently exert their 
economic power to influence these factors. The continued dominance of the fossil fuel industry, 
for example, is related not just to the low cost of these fuels, but to the power of the industry in 
securing large subsidies and lax environmental regulation (Goodell, 2006). Efforts to promote 
cleaner forms of energy and transportation have gained a degree of discursive legitimacy and are 
supported by a wide coalition of NGOs, government agencies, and even some companies in the 
‘clean energy’ sector. Nevertheless, these firms face substantial market barriers to entry and lack 
political access and influence. Moreover, the new technologies such as solar panels and fuel cells 
have not yet reached competitive cost and reliability levels; they are failing to ‘cooperate’, in the 
language of actor-network theory (Callon, 1987). 
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 In contested GPNs, industry often uses economic resources to pursue discursive strategies 
alongside other forms of political activity, thus building legitimating ideologies and governance 
structures to support particular economic arrangements. Awareness of commercial opportunities 
in biotechnology, for example, led entrepreneurial companies such as Monsanto to pursue public 
relations strategies to frame genetically modified (GM) seeds and foods as a benign extension of 
traditional methods of hybrid development that promise to improve yields and end hunger. 
Simultaneously, these companies worked in the political and legal sphere to secure property 
rights protection for GM products and to exempt them from the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration approval process (Andrée, 2005). Similarly, companies in fossil-fuel related 
sectors facing the climate change issue have expended considerable resources to lobby against 
mandatory emission controls at the international level, while casting doubt on the science of 
climate change and emphasizing the high costs of action (Levy & Egan, 2003). 
Industry strategies frequently extend beyond a particular GPN to shape broader global 
institutional structures. Key service sectors were prominent architects of the agreement to extend 
the global trade regime to include services during the Uruguay round of the GATT (the precursor 
to the WTO) (Wesselius, 2002). Sell (2002) has amply documented the leading role of MNCs in 
the software, entertainment, and pharmaceutical industries in promoting the discourse of 
intellectual property rights and in actually drafting accords for Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.  
Hegemonic fields are subject to continuous stress due to the dynamics of evolving 
technologies, markets and ideologies. The dominance of neoliberalism, for example, does not 
remain unchallenged; transnational institutions such as the World Bank and WTO have to 
accommodate financial crises in Asia associated with deregulation of capital, the failures of 
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water privatization in Latin America, and challenges from civil society to environmentally 
damaging infrastructure projects (Williams & Ford, 1999). A neo-Gramscian perspective on 
contested GPNs highlights the multiple dimensions of hegemonic structures and the potential for 
subordinate groups to develop coordinated strategies that take advantage of tensions and points 
of leverage in a complex socio-economic system. Indeed, a crucial element of Gramsci’s break 
from the economic determinism associated with Marx was his elucidation of the “Modern 
Prince”, the embodiment of collective strategic action by those with scarce access to material 
resources or formal authority. Gramsci used the term ‘war of position’ to describe a long-term 
strategy coordinated across multiple bases of power to gain legitimacy, shift economic relations, 
develop organizational capacity, and win new allies; social movements trying to change practices 
and structures in GPNs can be considered to be contemporary expressions of the Modern Prince, 
using clever strategy to outmaneuver structural forms of power (Barker et al., 2001; Levy, 
Willmott, and Alvesson, 2003; Sanbonmatsu, 2004). This insight is echoed in the institutional 
entrepreneurship literature, which suggests that subordinate actors need to rely more heavily on 
skills than material resources (Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2000). 
The effective deployment of strategic power requires a detailed analysis of GPN 
structures and processes. A GPN framework suggests that consumption of high-priced coffee and 
clothing brands and production by low-wage labor are intrinsically linked and mutually 
contingent. They are enabled by the intricate logistics of international production, yet they are 
also sustained by the economic, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and legal distanciation involved. As 
Henderson (2002: 446) suggests, GPNs “constitute and are re-constituted by the economic, social 
and political arrangements of the places they inhabit.” The balance of coercion and consent 
varies across countries, leaning more toward coercion in authoritarian countries, thus requiring 
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fewer concessions to labor and less elaborate forms of workplace control. The political 
sustainability of GPNs therefore depends, in part, on the insulating effect of distance between 
conditions of production and consumption. As Klein observes (2000: 347), “[i]t’s as if the global 
production chain  is based on the belief that workers in the South and consumers in the North 
will never figure out a way to communicate with each other.” 
Activists have used these insights in their attempts to build discursive and organizational 
connections across the barriers of distance to highlight the contradictions within GPNs. Multinational 
corporations operating across national boundaries are particularly vulnerable because they provide 
“opportunities for interest groups to identify practices used by the firm in some country that may be 
unacceptable in another country and to use those as a rallying point” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999: 74). 
NGOs engaged in a campaign against GM foods have explicitly used an understanding of the supply 
chain structure to target vulnerable food retailer chains in Europe, several of whom adopted GM-free 
policies (Schurman, 2004). In the clothing sector, student activists and labor groups developed 
alliances with religious organizations and targeted companies whose well-known brands make them 
particularly exposed to embarrassing disclosures. Activists have also successfully exerted pressure on 
U.S. universities with large sportswear contracts, leveraging public visibility and concentrated 
purchasing power (van Tulder & Kolk, 2003). NGOs found accounting firms to be unlikely allies 
interested in developing the business of auditing social reports and compliance with codes of conduct.  
 Hegemonic systems are resilient to challenge, however, and tend to absorb and deflect 
threats in ways that protect system fundamentals. Indeed, the long-term nature of a ‘war of 
position’ makes it difficult to evaluate the success of challenger strategies at a given point in 
time. Although some look optimistically to NGOs as a democratic force for change, representing 
the interests of labor, women, and the environment (Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004), a 
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Gramscian analysis suggests that civil society represents not only an arena of ideological 
struggle, but also a key element of the ‘extended state’ in which hegemony is secured.  
NGOs active in the coffee case have clearly made some significant gains; they have 
created an awareness of coffee as a political and social issue, pressured many of the coffee 
MNCs to adopt the ‘4C’ code of conduct, and they have helped to develop a market for Fair 
Trade and organic coffee that substantially raises incomes for at least some growers and 
eliminates some of the middlemen in the value chain. Yet these gains have not changed the core 
asymmetries of power and income in the coffee GPN, and have perhaps even strengthened the 
position of Western MNCs. The 4C code of conduct addresses the worst forms of corporate 
practice, such as the use of bonded and forced labor, peasant eviction, access to potable water for 
workers, and the use of banned pesticides (Kolk, 2005). It does not, however, touch structural 
features of the GPN that influence income distribution. Fair Trade and organic coffee do not 
comprise more than 1% of the global market (Talbot, 2004), offering just a few niche market 
opportunities for growers and highlighting the limitations of strategies that rely on socially-
motivated purchasing decisions by affluent Western consumers (Utting, 2002). Meanwhile, 
participation in these programs rewards coffee MNCs with stronger brand images and greater 
legitimacy; Starbucks, for example, benefits from the publicity it received when it announced in 
2001 a commitment to buy one million pounds of Fair Trade coffee over the following eighteen 
months, though this is less than 2% of its total coffee purchases. Growers excluded from the 
premium coffee segment find their position with commodity coffee is weaker than ever. 
 32
 
Conclusions and Implications 
This paper has developed a critical reconceptualization of international production by linking the 
analysis of global production networks with the literatures on institutional entrepreneurship and 
neo-Gramscian theory in international political economy. The result is a framework that provides 
insights into the nature of power and hegemony in a global production network, encompassing 
the dynamics of contestation and stability as actors employ economic, discursive, and 
organizational strategies. The framework is particularly valuable in perceiving GPNs as, at once, 
technically and organizationally sophisticated production networks, and as political systems 
encompassing multiple dimensions of power. While more conventional treatments drawing from 
commodity chain analysis focus on relations of market power among firms, here we consider 
GPNs in the context of wider institutional, political, and discursive structures, as well as linkages 
with NGOs and other actors usually considered to be external to GPNs. 
The institutional entrepreneurship literature is valuable in furthering our understanding of 
GPNs as contested fields in which actors develop a consciousness of their identities and interests, 
and forge strategies to mobilize resources, build alliances, and frame issues in particular ways. 
The neo-Gramscian approach adds to this conception in several ways. It offers an appreciation of 
the multi-level dynamic interactions between GPNs and broader, more entrenched hegemonic 
formations in the global political economy. It also offers theoretical linkages between the 
configuration of material, ideological, and organizational forces comprising hegemonic stability 
and contingency, and the strategies actors pursue to protect or challenge field formations. In 
particular, it suggests how actors who are relatively disadvantaged in terms of material resources 
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or formal authority can utilize smart strategy that takes advantage of fragile alliances or tensions 
within and between the economic and discursive spheres.   
At the same time, the multi-level and resilient nature of hegemony points to the 
limitations of strategic action for change. Dominant actors frequently respond to pressure from 
challengers with counter-strategies that entail a degree of local accommodation and compromise 
around a specific issue, but in a way that preserves the essentials of a field structure, and in some 
cases even reinforces their position. The ongoing and dynamic evolution of these fields suggests 
that it is difficult, at least in the short run, to distinguish between reformist strategies that lead to 
cooptation of challengers and the blunting of efforts for more systemic change, and long-term 
dynamic strategies that use the shifting terrain of compromise as the staging ground for another 
round of contestation.  
The concept of hegemony as contingent stability in an evolving, contested field, helps 
illuminate the coexistence of apparently contradictory trends in the global economy. On the one 
hand, companies are undertaking a plethora of initiatives under the mantle of corporate social 
responsibility, from annual social reports to the promulgation of codes of conduct. On the other 
hand, inequality is rising in many Western countries as workers suffer from weakened unions, 
loss of state provision of services, and increased competition from offshore sourcing and labor-
saving technologies. Neoliberal institutions and ideologies appear to remain well entrenched; 
indeed, the strengthening and extension of intellectual property rights in relation to software, 
biotechnology, entertainment, and pharmaceuticals suggests a strengthening of the market power 
of MNCs in these sectors and a deepening process of commodification. These contradictory 
trends can be understood as manifestations of a shifting balance of forces as actors engage in 
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strategies and counter-strategies at multiple levels across a complex economic and discursive 
terrain.  
While GCC/GPN analysis is centrally concerned with the relationship between high 
profit margins and market power, it has not developed a more fundamental critique of the terms 
‘value-added’ and ‘value chain’ and their ideological connotations. Indeed, these terms confer 
discursive legitimacy by emphasizing collaboration in the generation of wealth rather than 
conflicts over its distribution. The framework developed here renders problematic the entire 
conception of ‘value-added’, and suggests that relations of power are associated with inequalities 
in value appropriation. The managerial imperative to create and capture ‘value’ is inextricably 
linked to the rise since the 1980s of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of corporate governance that 
emphasizes ‘financialization’ of corporate objectives to meet capital market expectations and 
appease mutual fund managers (Williams, 2000). The primacy of shareholder value and the 
subjugation of production to financial market discipline is not necessarily congruent with 
sustainable economic prosperity (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000) nor with the well-being of a 
broader range of stakeholders (Hillman & Keim, 2001). Market power needs to be 
contextualized within broader cultural and political institutions that constitute the social value of 
brands and legitimate and enforce intellectual property rights. 
One implication of viewing markets within institutional and ideological contexts is that 
they are not the abstract, ahistorical constructions of economic theory; they can never be ‘free’. 
The coffee case in this paper illustrates how GPN governance transitioned from a system based 
on price and quantity regulation within a formal international agreement, to one that, ostensibly 
at least, is more market based. This market, however, has been shaped and conditioned by the 
struggle for control between coffee MNCs and developing country growers, the excess supply 
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induced by World Bank policies and export promotion in Vietnam and Brazil, the growth of 
premium and Fair Trade coffees, and industry self-regulation through codes of conduct. The 
market is not necessarily more ‘free’ under the new mode of governance; rather, it operates 
under a different matrix of forces and constraints. 
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1 Followers of the Austrian school of economists, most notably Ludwig von Mises (1985) and 
Friedrich von Hayek (1944), would also decry the distorting impact of political intervention on 
markets, though drawing very different implications. While Austrian school economists advocate 
the necessity of isolating markets from politics, this paper suggests the impossibility of doing so. 
 
2 Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was a radical Italian political theorist, journalist, and activist. He 
wrote The Prison Notebooks (1971) while imprisoned by Italy's Fascist government from 1926 to 
1934.  
 
3 The Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue is a network of more than 150 major North American 
and European firms that works with government officials to reduce barriers to economic 
integration and trade. 
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